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A PROPOSAL TO RETHINK THE WAY WE DEVELOP NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART
THE CASE FOR MORE SCIENCE, LESS ART
The most knowledgeable, capable, historically astute, military and government To be sure…the centrally controlled bombing of Vietnam-the modulated application of violence-resulted from a theory of strategic signaling and gradual escalation that proved calamitously false. The Communist leadership in Hanoi was simply too determined, too tough, too willing to accept suffering to yield to graduated pressure-or to "diplomatic" signals conveyed by bombs whistling their way into power stations or radar installations. Johnson and McNamara operated from a false strategic concept-a "theory of victory" that rested on a radically inadequate understanding of the opponent and, for that matter, of their own society. The argument thus becomes less a question of how they exercised civilian control than one of how well-or poorly-they thought about strategy. The problem is that for the most part strategy today is developed based on "art" as opposed to a rigorous procedure founded in scientific method. Military planners and leaders lack the ability to develop strategy with the assistance of a national military strategic mathematical model that has been developed through careful analysis of the situation; one that is captured in a system of mathematical equations that have been refined over time with continuous updates from current events; one that can provide the means to carefully analyze the various courses of actions with factual scrutiny, based on statistics, probabilities, and objective relationships, especially with respect to force projection.
At the outset of the Iraq War the American military profession once again found itself in a strategic dilemma. The basic question at hand was to determine the correct number of troops required in all phases, but especially the stabilization phase of the operation. Some planners felt a 40:1 or 50:1 ratio was necessary (one soldier for every 40 to 50 inhabitants) based on the requirements for operations in Germany after World War II or the Kosovo Campaign. 3 Others stressed that it was not the number of troops, it was how those troops were used and what their capabilities were. 4 But in the end, whether the number of troops that deployed was the right amount, too many, or too few was still a matter of great debate. Unfortunately for the American military, politicians, and the public, there was no objective model with which to compare their proposed strategy -only subjective opinion.
In this day of great electronic analytical capability with giant super-computers and amazingly accurate mathematical models for a wide array of complex systems from tilt-rotor aircraft to diverse social-political opinion, there is no good excuse to rely solely on the hunches of military and government leaders to create wartime strategy. Edward N. Luttwak, a twentieth century military theorists, warns his readers of the "paradoxical logic of war." Paradoxical logic is that which tells a planner that in combat a bad road is good (because the enemy must think it is too bad to use -so it must be good). 5 Paradoxical logic is that which tells the leaders of one country to build up their arsenal in order to be prepared to defend themselves, not realizing that the neighboring country will attack preemptively, fearing that the buildup will leave it vulnerable. 6 With so much at stake, national military strategy should not be left to the intuition of leaders; it should be based on rigorous, scientific method and created with all the best tools of technology.
While the American military community today takes full advantage of such technology to test strategy by using high-powered war game technology and to implement strategy by using applications that develop and execute deployment schedules for full scale operations, the development of the baseline national military strategy is viewed by most theorists and national leaders to be more of an art than a science.
CLASSIC THINKING REGARDING THE "ART" OF MILITARY STRATEGY
Most military professionals, historians, and strategists would disagree with the proposal to resort to science while in the pursuit of a successful campaign strategy. Most of the notable classic military theorists tend to disagree with such a proposal as well. Karl von Clausewitz, perhaps the most esteemed of all military theorists, held a distinct opinion on the subject:
We must admit that wherever it would be too laborious to determine the facts of the situation, we must have recourse to the relevant principles established by theory. But in the same way as in war these truths are better served by a commander who has absorbed their meaning in his mind rather than one who treats them as rigid external rules, so the critic should not apply them like an external law or an algebraic formula whose relevance need not be established each time it is used. These truths should always be allowed to become selfevident, while only the more precise and complex proofs are left to theory. 7 According to Clausewitz the information necessarily gathered to formulate strategy was far too subjective to be used as "prescriptive formulation." 8 Further, moral and psychological forces entangle with physical forces to create an environment too complex to determine through scientific axiom and law. Clausewitz also believed that since war is a series of reciprocal actions, and it is impossible to be sure what the enemy might do, developing strategy will always require a great deal of subjectivity. 9 Ironically, although Clausewitz opposed the idea of using rigorous scientific method to determine strategy, his own works were filled with references and apparent comparisons to physical sciences. Most notably, Clausewitz used the term "center of gravity" to describe "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends [and] the point against which all our energies should be directed." 10 The term "center of gravity" was originally derived from the physical sciences. Similarly, the physical sciences version of center of gravity is a "hub of all power and movement" for selected mechanical systems. Clausewitz borrowed meaning for his most critical terminology from science. In addition, Clausewitz used the term "friction," which again was used in a very similar context to the analysis of a physical system. In one final example, although there are others, Clausewitz referred to the economy of force, which refers to the efficiency of the military forces but which is similar to the overall efficiency of a mechanical system. From these examples one can see that Clausewitz was at least willing on some level to accept the value of the use of scientific concepts to characterize strategy.
Although efficiency, friction, and centers of gravity are measurable and quantifiable,
Clausewitz opposed quantifiable determinations with respect to military strategy. He felt it was far too complex to assign numerical amounts to forces or any other aspect of military strategy.
He said, "…to accept the superiority of numbers as the one and only rule, and to reduce the whole secret of the art of war to the formula of numerical superiority at a certain time in a certain place was an oversimplification that would not have stood up for a moment against the realities of life."
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Antoine Henri Jomini is another classic strategic theorist from the same era as Clausewitz.
Born in Switzerland, full general in the Imperial Army of the Czar, and author of Summary of the Art of War, which has directly or indirectly influenced American generals since the Civil War,
Jomini is commonly considered a determinist: one who embraced a theory of war based on indisputable principles. 12 Jomini is best known for producing theory that was based largely on geometric order. For this he received great criticism, compelling him to rebut. He stated in Summary, "…these figures have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate arrangements." 13 He went on to say, "nothing is better calculated to kill natural genius and to cause error to triumph, than those pedantic theories, based upon the false idea that war is a positive science, all the operations of which can be reduced to infallible calculations." 14 But in spite of his stated position, Jomini went on to provide thirteen items of importance regarding strategy as well as four specific principles of war and several very specific axioms regarding the theater of operations; bases of operations; strategic, decisive, and objective points; and zones of operations. 15 Many of these principles are articulated in terms of relationships that can, with a robust systems approach, be expressed in quantifiable, comparative formulae.
The well known ancient Eastern military philosopher Sun Tzu has been celebrated for creating simple axioms that referred to human values and emotions, especially with respect to general warfare. But he also had a propensity to occasionally boil strategy down to simple quantifiable relationships.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. 16 This seemingly simple principle, if taken at face value, can certainly be made into a quantifiable set of equations from which to base robust strategic formulation. Critics may argue that Sun
Tzu's rules of strategy are too general and are therefore not very useful or likely to work for many situations. However, for their time they were certainly a positive first step toward the proper incorporation of mathematical and scientific structure into the formulation of strategy.
One of the more modern strategists, Admiral John C. Wylie who wrote of military strategy in the second half of the twentieth century, while not committing to the formulation of strategic laws similar to physical laws, recognized the need for a scientific approach to development of strategy. Most importantly, Wylie recognized that military strategy has been a field neglected by academics and scientists. He felt that due to the magnitude of its importance on the world scale, military strategy should finally be analyzed more seriously in the scientific sense. Wylie contends:
Of all the great fields into which human energy has been directed, certainly war has caused more trouble than any other. Death and destruction and heartbreak, political upset and economic chaos and social disorder -war involves them all. Yet the scholars have managed with almost serene indifference to ignore the problem of the theories of war and their effect on the conduct of war. But with all his shortfalls, only time will tell whether DuPuy was a pioneer in scientific discipline of the development of strategy.
The debate surrounding whether to rely more on science or art while developing strategy and whether it is even possible to fully utilize robust scientific method in this regard was played out in detail in the national security journal Security Studies. In rebuttal, Pape pointed out that "the essence of science is the use of scientific method"
and that "above all else, a commitment to the use of observable evidence to verify or falsify cause and effect hypothesis in a manner which avoid arbitrary, ad hoc assessments of a particular case" 28 is the central concern in the use of science. Pape argued that while it may not be easily discernible, there is in all likelihood, at least some degree of regularity in the social science of human interactions with respect to war. If this were not true, then there is no sense in studying war whatsoever, and we would forever be doomed to repeat history. Further, he argued that "if social outcomes are really so random and inconsistent that they lack identifiable patterns, there would be no point in studying history, and that there could be no such thing as an expertise, particularly a military expertise." 29 There could be simply no ability to predict whatsoever. Fortunately, there are repeatable cause and effect relationships in war, and policy makers can benefit from previously similar circumstances and outcomes. Pape then proposed that policy makers like the president do not have the luxury of assuming that prediction is too hard. For that reason, it is the duty of strategists and military theorists to pursue the concept of reliable scientific method in developing military strategy. 30 One can easily see that there are formidable positions on both sides of the debate. The classic theorists argued against the notion of quantifying the process by which national military strategy is developed, but their own works provide at least some foundation in numerical solutions. More modern theorists recognize that the "art" could stand some improvement using modern scientific methodology, but still contend that strategy should be based on intuition. But the force of science is growing ever stronger and more persistent, and the possibility of improving the national military strategic development process through scientific method and mathematical modeling should at least be evaluated. military-political systems. From there, we will appraise the prospect of combining the two fields of study and finally we will study some existing rigorous methods of analysis for the operational and strategic levels of war.
DEVELOPING THE SCIENTIFIC MODEL
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES OF CLASSIC THEORISTS
The Eighth and final book of On War is entitled "War Plans". In it, Clausewitz proposed a methodology to use the vast array of theory on military strategy that he has provided in the previous seven books. Ever consistent, Clausewitz warned not to try to find the geometric solution to military strategy. In so doing he advised that "[t]heory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side." 31 But again, he did not shut the door completely on the prospect of establishing a linear system for analysis and prediction when he immediately followed with, "But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and their relationships then leave it free to rise into higher realms of action." 32 Clausewitz recognizes here, that there are relationships between the phenomena of war. As we shall see, relationships form the foundation of a scientific analysis.
Clausewitz's method for developing strategy begins with defining an objective. "No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." 33 Clausewitz established with this statement and the subsequent explanation that it is necessary to determine the political purpose and the operational objective, especially if the objective is a limited solution (vice the total defeat of the enemy). The next step in his process was to attempt to gather and capture the ever present complexities of war in a somewhat logical fashion. In rather ambiguous terms he stated,
No logical sequence could progress through their innumerable twists and turns as though it were a simple thread that linked two deductions. Logic comes to a stop in this labyrinth; and those men who habitually act, both in great and minor affairs, on particular dominating impressions or feelings rather than according to strict logic, are hardly aware of the confused, inconsistent, and ambiguous situation in which they find themselves. 34 In the next steps of his process Clausewitz speculated that one must determine the elements of war and their interdependence. Degree of force, political demands, strength of will, character, abilities, ability to mobilize and the scale of mobilization required, strength and situation of the opposing state, cash resources, treasury, credit, and the backing of the population are some of the elements Clausewitz hypothesized must be gauged in order to determine a correct strategy. 35 His next step was to plan for the defeat and destruction of the enemy's fighting force. He laid out three approaches to accomplish this feat: 1.) destruction of his army; 2.) seizure of his capital; 3.) striking an effective blow to his principal ally. 36 Subsequent chapters of On War contain numerous step-by-step methodical instructions for conducting war. For example, Clausewitz provided systematic directions on how to conduct offensive operations and detailed instructions for how to roll up an enemy from the left flank. 37 Further, Clausewitz devoted an entire chapter to the interdependence of politics and military operations in the conduct of war; a relationship that should be necessarily accounted for in the development of a scientific strategic model. 38 In the final chapter of On War, Clausewitz laid out a fairly orderly process for developing a plan of war for the total defeat of the enemy, as opposed to limited warfare. 39 Although it is based on guiding principles, Clausewitz's methodical instructions on how to conduct war would almost certainly lend itself well to codified language.
In Art of War, Jomini took an approach almost exactly opposite to Clausewitz. Unlike
Clausewitz, who provided general principles and specific methodical instructions for implementation, Jomini provided specific rules of war but vague direction or guidance pertaining to the creation of a strategic plan. For example, Jomini listed the thirteen principles of strategy, ranging from the selection of the theater to points for camps and diversions. 40 He catalogued the four maxims or principles of war. 41 He cited, in detail, the nine important features of a theater of operations. 42 He even provided the rules for selecting tactical positions and the twelve essential rules necessary for a perfect army. 43 But aside from providing a short, sketchy list of the times when a government should go to war, Jomini falls short of providing a detailed set of instructions for planning or creating strategy.
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES OF MODERN THEORISTS
Like all of J.C. Wylie's philosophy on strategy, his approach to developing a strategic plan for implementation is relatively direct and straight forward. Wylie contended that the strategist should first exert some degree of control of the enemy by selecting the outline of thought, the scene, or the pattern of war (e.g., maritime, continental, air, or insurgency). This step is accomplished by manipulating the center of gravity to the advantage of the friendly nation and the disadvantage of the opponent. The next step is to control the nature, placement, timing, and weight of the center of gravity. Finally, exploit the resulting pattern of war toward the strategist's end. 44 Wylie's process is not very detailed or helpful to the student of strategy, especially when it is taken out of the context of the rest of the material contained in Military Strategy. In addition, strategy is a relationship of ends, ways, and means. Further, Lykke believed the strategy developed must balance these three elements (ends, ways, and means), in order to avoid significant risk. Lykke presented a very simple model for determining national security strategy, centered on the trilateral balance between ends, ways, and means. 45 In addition, this model called for a determination of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability, followed by an overall risk assessment of the strategic concept. Lykke's model is intuitive and simple, and ensures a process that hones the resultant strategy to within certain constraints. However, since the development of a grand strategy is simply a step in the process, this model would most likely only be helpful in providing the framework for the military strategy model we seek.
METHODOLOGY REQUIRED TO DEVELOP MODELS FOR COMPLEX SYSTEMS
We have seen many of the general processes that classic and modern strategists have devised to create strategy. Next we shall examine the processes and the tools used by engineers, scientists, and mathematicians who routinely model complex systems. The objective of the modeler is to translate all the knowledge of a system into mathematical equations that can then be manipulated and exploited to form a predictive model that produces reams of data from which to perform analysis. A key step in this task falls to the mathematician. The mathematician must translate substantive ideas regarding the immense system at hand into precise, mathematical statements. In any modeling project the type of modeling system employed depends on the complexity of the system. There are four different types of models a mathematician can employ. The simplest of models is the first-order linear differential equation with constant coefficients. This model uses a time series of a single state variable with only a single variable. 46 This model could be used to depict the build up of forces in a specific operational zone over time.
The second model is a first-order nonlinear differential equation with constant coefficients.
This type of equation is slightly more complex than the first model in that it employs a second order variable, but the use of this equation provides a more complete and more useful result.
Use of this type of model for social interaction has shown the capability to predict equilibrium and qualitative behavior over time. Possible uses for this equation could include the depiction of population demography or rapid changes in public opinion. 47 The third model available is the system of first order linear equations. This model is useful in capturing interdependence among variables. This particular modeling system has often been used to model such complex systems as an arms race, economic or financial systems, or feedback models such as legislative interaction. 48 The final model is the system of nonlinear equations. This model format involves multiple variables and multiple sets of equations, and it enables the mathematician to capture complex interdependence. 49 This modeling system has been used to model such a multifaceted yet thorny system as the budgeting process. It is therefore likely that this would be the one most useful and most suitable approaches for the development of national and military strategy.
MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF STRATEGY
So what process should one follow to determine the set of equations that equates to the complex national military system? Typically, the scientist modeling the system employs scientific method in order to determine the interdependence and relative values of variables that will be used to create the model. Scientific method requires five fundamental elements.
1. Causal Generalization. Scientific method and subsequent mathematical modeling requires the existence of an "if-then" relationship between two or more variables.
2. Operational Definitions of Variables. It is necessary to establish set parameters for the measurement of variables to avoid ad hoc interpretation that lead to the introduction of imprecise results.
3. Co-variation. This is the process by which one determines whether the causal relationship is present only when hypothesized: no more, no less. Determining the set of relationships between variables in a national military strategic system can be a daunting undertaking. Some would say it is impossible to capture the complexities of such a convoluted system, particularly when one considers the instabilities involved, to include: policy, capabilities, alliances, national and international opinion, current events, unstable governments, and the motives of politicians. However, there are at least some theorists who claim it is still possible to model such complex systems.
In the broadest sense, Ludwig von Bertalanffy was a pioneer in the development of models of complex systems, especially those that involved human interaction and social circumstances. Bertalanffy developed the General Systems Theory that provided psychologists a more empirical method of examining problems. The overall concept of this theory is that a psychologist or a sociologist can utilize "the ability to obtain information from other sciences that can give an advanced explanation." 51 For example, one can use laws of physics or thermodynamics to determine the likely reasoning for social-human behavior. This concept allows for a holistic, systems approach to modeling human interaction, and it has been well accepted by social scientists. In fact, the social science discipline has made great progress in the domain of modeling complex social systems as well as political sciences. Today most analysis are either rigorous but narrow, or broad but unrigorous. Mathematical models of combat, for example, are rigorous but typically focus on material alone: how many troops or weapons do the sides have, and how good is their equipment? By contrast, holistic assessments consider issues such as strategy, tactics, morale, combat motivation, or leadership as well as just materiel but treat these variables much less systematically. 54 Biddle stressed that mathematics is simply an alternative form of language, and that it is useful to "describe causal relationships [ Bellany's "Modeling War" is one such example. 58 In addition, while Biddle's and Bellany's work is excellent for determining the disposition and strength of forces as a function of time, this system is not necessarily useful to determine strategy. Most models for combat in the field today are combat simulation models that build on tactical or operation models. These models, like
Biddle's, are inherently time dependent and not especially suited for the development of strategy. The independent variable that should be utilized in a more suitable strategy model might be based on the elements of national power: military force, information, legal, diplomacy, intelligence, finance, and economics.
IS A SCIENTIFIC MODELING TOOL DESIGNED TO BE USED TO DEVELOP STRATEGY A SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION?
We have shown that the current methods of developing strategy that rely predominantly on the intuition of the leader or strategist have produced insufficient results. In addition, we have shown that although classic theorists oppose the concept of using scientific method or mathematical means to develop strategy, some more modern theorists have used the more rigorous approach. Finally, we have proposed a scheme to develop a scientific approach to strategic development that combines scientific method, mathematical modeling and classic theory. But would this produce a strategy that enables the leadership to accomplish the national mission? Would it accomplish this task with available resources? And, would the advantages of this methodology balance costs and risks?
The methods proposed by this scientific and mathematical approach to strategy in all likelihood would not produce instant success. Success in modeling complex systems is dependent on how well the overall model can be adapted to known results, or "truth." As the model is initially developed, scientists will require truthful data to input into the system in order to set parameters for a large variety of conditions. These data would be gathered from existing scenarios and historical conflicts as well as particular items of information pertaining to the elements of power for all states involved. The initial versions of this model might not produce satisfactory results because of the unknown relationships between various sub-systems. But as the system develops the model can be honed to precision. Every new element of information from every scenario involving national power can be added to the various look-up tables for every new condition. Eventually, as the model matures, the model and the resultant strategy could provide extremely accurate, in-depth, scientific analysis based on all the best classic theory planners and military professionals have come to trust. As a result, today's leaders could invariably improve their ability to create effective strategy using a quantifiable, logical, analytical system capable of robust examination of entire arrays of conditions.
A system such as this, however, does not come without a heavy price. The proposed system would take an immense amount of manpower to create the code, capture the historical data as sets of parameters, develop the relationships, and make the continuous improvements.
The system would require years of testing, modifications, and re-testing. Finally, once the system was put into service, planners and strategists would require in-depth training. In addition, a system such as this would require a very expensive high speed processor with stateof-the-art security. In summary, a system such as this would take many years and millions, if not billions, of dollars to develop.
Once this system was developed, however, the country would have one of the most important weapons ever created. The value of an analytical tool that can reliably predict the best course of action for every objective, every scenario, and every crisis is priceless in terms of lives saved and security maintained. The effort involved and the resources expended to create such a tool would be relatively small and practically a moral obligation of military and civilian leadership to the citizens of this country.
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